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ABSTRACT  
 
Purpose This paper studies government budgeting which is traditionally regarded as opaque. 
 
Design/Methodology/Approach The approach is a case study with multiple sources of 
information including policy documents, minutes of meetings and elite interviews 
 
Findings Transparency is widely regarded as of intrinsic value in contemporary society. This 
study reveals opposition to transparency by elected politicians and the manner in which it is 
enacted. 
 
Research Limitations/ Implications  Further studies in different contexts to determine the 
generality of these findings would be useful. 
 
Originality/Value This study is the first to examine the 3 stage model of transparency devised 
by Biondi and Lapsley (QRAM 2014). This offers a more nuanced understanding of what 
transparency means in the context of government budgets. 
 
Keywords: Government budgeting; transparency; political context 
 
Paper Type: Research paper 
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1. Introduction 
Transparency denotes government according to fixed and published rules, on the basis 
of information and procedures that are accessible to the public and within clearly 
demarcated fields of activity (Hood, 2001 p.701). This paper examines the issue of 
transparency in government budgeting which  should be a key public accountability 
mechanism. Indeed, the desire for transparency in public affairs has become a taken for 
granted aim of public finances in the 21st century as a way to give credibility to 
economic policies and thereby, enhancing economic growth (Bastida and Benito, 2009). 
It is defined as full disclosure of all relevant fiscal information in a timely and 
systematic manner (OECD, 2001). It is an aim which is reiterated by many international 
bodies and governments (International Monetary Fund, 2014; OECD, 2014, p.19) as an 
aim which is beyond reproach.  
There is now a burgeoning literature on the subject of transparency in government, 
particularly regarding public finances. However, most of this literature is directed at 
discussion of transparency as an external, outward-facing phenomenon by which state 
bodies are, or should be, held publicly accountable for their activities. A new 
development in the transparency literature is the need to address internal transparency 
in public services organisations as an important element of the transparency debate 
(Heald, 2012; 2013; Robbins and Lapsley, 2015). In this regard, the particular facet of 
transparency which is discussed in this paper is that of internal transparency. This focus 
offers a fresh perspective on government budgeting. While government budgeting has 
gained a longstanding notoriety for being complex and opaque (Likierman and Vass, 
1984; Likierman and Creasey, 1985; Connolly and Hyndman, 2006; Kurunmaki et al., 
2011; Ezzamel et al, 2014), these studies have not uncovered key aspects of poltical 
behaviour in budgeting. These earlier studies have revealed how politicians have an 
interest in, but difficulties with, government budgeting (Alesina and Perotti, 1996; 
Ezzamel et al, 2014). This study goes beyond these findings and reveals how the 
behaviour of elected members of parliaments can undermine transparency. 
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The aim of this paper is to examine the topic of internal transparency within the 
Scottish Parliament, an organisation which has made an explicit obligation to be 
transparent in financial matters. This paper uses the Biondi and Lapsley (2014) model of 
transparency (BL model) to determine the extent to which the avowed aim of 
transparency at the Scottish Parliament is achieved in practice. Specifically, we seek to 
analyse if the three levels of budget transparency advocated by the BL model ((1) 
access; (2) understanding and (3) shared meanings or understandings) are being 
achieved by the main actors involved in the Scottish budget process, namely, the 
Scottish Parliament’s Committees, the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government. 
For this purpose, we use a combined methods approach with documentary analysis, 
some observation and elite interviews with experienced parliamentarians. 
Therefore, this paper contributes to the emergent literature on internal transparency by 
offering fresh evidence on government budgeting using a novel lens, the BL model 
(Biondi and Lapsley, 2014), to study internal transparency in practice. In advancing this 
3 stage model of transparency, Biondi and Lapsley (2014) were only able to examine the 
first stage of their model. This paper contributes the first attempt to evaluate all three of 
the Biondi-Lapsley stages of transparency.  This offers a more nuanced perspective for 
the study of transparency in government budgeting. Our findings reveal the fundamental 
significance of the political context in achieving or inhibiting transparency in 
government budgeting. In particular, while this paper explores government budgeting 
from the perspective of transparency, there are significant issues around the dimension 
of trust. This paper uncovers evidence of a study setting which has declared aims of 
transparency but in which elected representatives exploit their discretion to undermine 
transparency. This is a major issue for all those concerned with government budgeting. 
Much of the extant literature on transparency presumes governments face instrumental 
situations in which information is provided and acted upon. This study questions that 
perspective. This paper offers evidence that elected representatives can and will exploit 
their discretion to undermine transparency, which raises significant issues of trust in 
politicians by the electorate. 
The paper is organised as follows: the next section discusses transparency; then the 
research context and the research design for this study are set out; the results from this 
study are then analysed. Finally, concluding observations are made. 
2. Theoretical framework: transparency 
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A fundamental, desired attribute of accounting and management in public sector 
organisations is that of transparency. The intrinsic merit of transparency as a feature of 
public management is advanced by Shah et al. (2003). Indeed, Hood (2006) describes 
‘transparency’ in public management as having acquired a ‘quasi-religious’ influence. 
This pressure for transparency in public finances has assumed an international 
significance (Gomez et al., 2004; Relly and Sabharwal, 2009; Hood, 2013). The extant 
literature on financial transparency emphasises an outward facing, external 
accountability regime for public service organisations (see, for example, Hood and 
Heald, 2006). We can see this perspective in the observations that transparency is 
essential in promoting effective public accountability (Koppell, 2005) because it acts as 
a powerful tool to counter opaqueness (Roberts, 2009). Moreover, there are implicit 
assumptions within the arguments of proponents of transparency that, somehow, greater 
transparency has better policy outcomes, but this is unproven (Finkelstein, 2000).  
New Public Management (NPM) reforms have accentuated the need for greater 
transparency from public sector bodies. However, while public sector reforms based on 
the NPM shift public management to a results-orientation, which encourages external 
scrutiny and transparency of public sector organisations finances (Hood, 1991), there is 
growing recognition that there is need for a more nuanced understanding of internal 
transparency (Heald, 2012; 2013; Robbins and Lapsley, 2015). An enhanced internal 
transparency of accounting information can be seen as the mirror image of external 
accountability (Robbins and Lapsley, 2015). An early observation by Hood (1996, 
p.155) highlights the significance of more sophisticated internal accounting in public 
sector organisations which is of intrinsic interest to both managers and external 
stakeholders:  
 “.. budgets are becoming more ‘transparent’ in accounting terms, attributing costs 
to outputs and measuring outputs by qualitative  performance indicators.” 
The characteristics of public sector organisations further the case for internal 
transparency. In Heald’s analysis, vertical accountability, which is found in 
predominantly hierarchical public sector organisations, is always accompanied by 
horizontal pressures for inwards transparency within the organisation (Heald, 2012). 
This is the logical outcome of an NPM managerial regime in which managers have to 
act on financial and performance information within their organisations (Strathern, 
2004; Arnaboldi et al., 2015). A well-designed hierarchy of reporting documents is 
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essential to underpin meaningful transparency (Heald, 2012), thus allowing users to drill 
down from an overview to relevant segmental details as needed. In this way internal 
transparency can be seen as an essential component of effective managerial decision 
making and control systems (Schedler, 2003; Wouters and Wilderom, 2008; Carlsson-
Watt et al., 2015). In the public sector, this information is then divulged to a wide range 
of potentially interested persons, including citizens, elected representatives of citizens, 
users of services and oversight bodies as a necessary part of public accountability.  
There are also issues over the nature of transparency, itself, which appears simple and 
straightforward, but which may prove complex in practice. The mere act of making 
available new forms of information to achieve transparency can be seen as uni-
dimensional and not addressing the complexity of the different behaviours of actors in 
the exercise of accountability (Meijer, 2009; 2013). To further develop emergent ideas 
of what constitutes ‘transparency’, there is a need to extend our understanding beyond 
disclosure and awareness. This process needs to recognise that the transmission of 
information is not without cost (Etzioni, 2010) and may not be neutral, and that 
important elements of transparency reside in the capacity of intended recipients to 
interrogate financial information. In fact, transparency must be more than disclosure or 
openness. If transparency is to lead to accountability and ultimately to trust, 
organisations must ensure that their disclosures are accessible to, and assessable by, 
relevant stakeholders (Heald, 2006a; 2006b; O’Neill, 2006). Therefore, the concept of 
transparency – in theory and in practice – merits further study and this paper seeks to 
contribute to an emergent theory of internal transparency by using the BL model. 
Government budgeting is the focus of this paper, where the intersection of public 
interest, political manoeuvring, government obligation and media scrutiny combines 
with the need to oversee the delivery of public services to citizens. To address this focus 
on government budgeting, this paper draws on BL model, which identified three levels 
of transparency (Biondi and Lapsley, 2014): 
1. At one level, access to information is seen as achieving the aim of transparency 
(Cangiano, 1996; Kondo, 2002; Nielsen and Madsen, 2009); 
2. A second level of transparency which is best achieved when there is a genuine 
level of understanding of the phenomenon disclosed (Winkler, 2000, p.7); and 
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3. A third level of transparency which is achieved where a sophisticated level of 
understanding, which extends to shared meanings, is held by potentially interested 
parties in the phenomenon disclosed (Florini, 1999; Christensen, 2002; van 
Bijsterveld, 2005).  
The potential of the BL model is highly significant. There is a vast and growing interest 
in the subject of transparency. However, much of this literature presumes disclosure of 
information achieves transparency. This is a simplistic approach. The BL model 
challenges that prevailing trend and offers a more sophisticated approach to evaluate the 
extent to which government bodies can claim that they do indeed operate with 
transparency in public finances. The aim of this paper is to examine these three levels of 
budget transparency in the Scottish budgetary system, which allows a more in depth 
analysis of internal transparency. Specifically, we seek to determine if these levels of 
budget transparency are being achieved by the main actors involved in the Scottish 
budget process, namely, the Scottish Parliament’s Committees, the Scottish Parliament 
and the Scottish Government. These issues are deliberated upon further in the light of 
the evidence from this study. 
3. Research context: the Scottish Parliament 
The Scottish Parliament is a pertinent study setting for an investigation of government 
budgeting from a transparency perspective. It is a new parliament which was established 
in 1999 by devolving powers from Westminster, the UK Parliament. This new 
parliament was created in reaction to perceptions that priorities and shifting emphasis of 
public policy at Westminster were out of sympathy with majority opinion in Scotland 
(Gamble, 2006). The pre-1999 arrangements offered a lack of political accountability 
with few Scottish pieces of legislation being debated at Westminster, with suspicions 
that civil servants at the Scottish Office had too much influence and limited public 
scrutiny of the policies and actions of the Secretary of State for Scotland and his team 
(Bogdanor, 2001). This new parliament was designed to support scrutiny and discussion 
of the activities of the Scottish Government. An overriding focus of this new parliament 
has been openness in parliamentary activities (Mitchell, 2006). This offers the 
opportunity to study governmental budgeting in a parliament with the declared aim of 
achieving transparency. 
The concept of devolution was that the government held reserve powers for policies to 
be handled centrally (foreign policy, defence, economics policy, etc.), with delegated 
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powers devolved to the Scottish Parliament for key services (including health, 
education, social services). As part of the process of preparing for devolution, the then 
Secretary of State for Scotland initiated a Financial Issues Advisory Group (FIAG) to 
advise the Scottish Parliament on budgetary control. The FIAG recommended that the 
overwhelming aim of the budgetary system of the new Scottish Parliament was that of 
transparency: the management of finances in a way that is open, accessible and 
accountable to the people of Scotland (Scottish Office, 1998, p.3).  
The Scottish Parliament is a unicameral body, with supporting business Committees for 
each of the departments comprising the Scottish Executive which cover the spectrum of 
parliamentary business and which include members of all political parties. These 
Committees fulfil a major function in the Scottish Parliament’s discharge of its 
responsibilities (Lynch, 2001). The FIAG observed that it would not be appropriate for 
the Scottish Parliament to merely adopt the existing practices of budgetary scrutiny of 
the UK Parliament at Westminster because of the limited scrutiny of budgetary 
documents, and it recommended an inclusive budgetary cycle at which all the business 
Committees of the Parliament could comment on and influence the budget (Scottish 
Office, 1998b, p.28). The adoption of these budgetary practices presents the possibility 
of a more deliberate consideration of Parliamentary business in a non-partisan setting - a 
setting which, prima facie, is favourable to the potential of accounting informing the 
decision-making process (Ezzamel et al., 2014).  
Within the Scottish Parliament’s budgetary scrutiny process, these business Committees 
were charged with evaluation of strategic priorities and of the draft budget. The 
evaluations of these business Committees on the budget are collated by the Finance 
Committee of the Scottish Parliament for a debate in the Parliament itself. These 
activities by Parliamentary Committees are a prelude to the formal evaluation of the 
budget in the Scottish Parliament. These aspects of government budgeting  are a major 
focus of this research. 
4. Research design 
The aim of this paper is to examine the three levels of budget transparency advocated by 
the BL model (Biondi and Lapsley, 2014) in the Scottish budgetary system. This is a 
case study research project, which allows a more in depth analysis of internal 
transparency (Stake, 1995). Specifically, we seek to determine if these levels of budget 
transparency are achieved by the main actors involved in the Scottish budget process, 
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namely, the Scottish Parliament’s Committees, the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish 
Government.  
The major source of information in this research is public documents. Documents may 
fulfil a variety of purposes: obstacles to understanding, carriers of information and 
‘facts’ to be translated and interpreted (Prior, 2003, p.21). The analysis of documents 
provides important traces of how of this Parliament functions.. Parliamentary documents 
are not mere receptacles of information. They are important traces of policy debate and 
contests which reveal outcomes of interaction and context in the everyday life of this 
organisation.  
Therefore, documents exhibit much deeper meanings than their nominal content might 
indicate. The role of documents as the gathering of ‘facts’, which shapes both policy 
making and judgement, has wider influences. In particular, these representations may 
represent an integration of the views, positions and alignment of key actors in policy 
debates (Prior, 2008).  
This research team recognises the merits of other approaches to data collection and 
analysis. To this end, the authors undertook limited observations on their frequent visits 
to this study site. However, to the extent that there is observation in this study, it is non-
participant and ‘on the periphery of interaction’ (Bryman, 1989, p.153). These 
observations informed the research team thinking and analysis. In addition, the research 
team undertook elite interviews with experienced Parliamentarians to complete our 
evidence on the transparency of budgetary processes. Elite interviews are notoriously 
difficult to obtain and to arrange, given the pressures on the interview subjects (Lilleker, 
2003). However, these interviews offer authoritative insights into the prevalence of 
transparency within the Scottish budgetary system (Harvey, 2011). 
This study examines the experiences of Session 4 of the Scottish Parliament (2011-
2016). This is the first majority government in Scotland since the Scottish Parliament 
was established in 1999. We use a sample of Scottish Parliament’s Committees from 
Session 4. Specifically, we use those Scottish Parliament’s Committees whose business 
has more weight on the Scottish Government’s Budget. They are shown in Table 1. 
  
(Table 1 here) 
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Firstly, we look at the Committees’ meetings that deal with budget issues during Session 
4 to evaluate if they scrutinise the Scottish Government’s Draft Budget in a transparent 
way. This analysis tests the presumption that politicians are positive supporters of the 
desirability of transparency by examining how they exercise their discretion to disclose 
or not, important parts of their Committee decisions. Second, the research team tested 
the BL model of transparency by examining the Committees’ official reports on Scottish 
Government’s Draft Budget 2014-15. This was to assess the level of financial 
transparency of the Scottish Government. This tests whether the Scottish Government’s 
Draft Budget is transparent (or not), by focussing on the Committees official reports on 
Government’s Draft Budget.  
Third, we examine the evidence from the elite interviews. These interviews supplement 
the documentary analysis of the Committee work. The elite interviews offer insights into 
interviewee experiences of the transparency of the Scottish budgetary system as a 
whole. These were interviews with six experienced Members of the Scottish Parliament 
(MSP) with involvement in the main Committees of the Scottish Parliament. We 
selected these MSP to ensure that the political parties represented in the parliament were 
included. These MSPs were primarily selected because of their knowledge and 
experience of scrutinising government budgeting. They were selected because they had 
sufficient expertise both to comment on processes within the government budgetary 
cycle and to comment on the participation by other members of parliamentary 
committees in the scrutiny of government budgets. We interviewed these six MSP 
during the months of March and April 2014 in their offices in the Parliament For this 
purpose, we designed a questionnaire which consists of 9 open questions on budget 
transparency matters. The interviewees were given sight of the questions and we went 
through these questions in sequence. The questionnaire used in this study is available 
from the authors.  
5. Results: The Attenuation of Transparency 
5.1. The Political Decision to Withdraw from the Public Gaze 
An overriding observation of this study is the manner in which actions by elected 
representatives limit transparency. Scrutiny of reports of the official meetings of the 
Scottish Parliament’s Committees shows an inclination of elected members of the 
parliament to constrain the public nature of their debates, to opt for in camera (private) 
meetings and thereby, to undermine transparency. Where politicians have discretion 
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over divulging or restraining information from these meetings, there is a consistent 
pattern of having private meetings and  withdrawing from the public gaze. Given the 
stated aim of transparency by the Scottish  Parliament, this behaviour  raises doubts 
about the extent to which the electorate can trust politicians. This dimension of 
transparency is revisited below. 
The Scottish Parliament`s Committees’ meetings that deal with budget issues during 
Session 4 of the Scottish Parliament are examined in some detail, next.  Specifically, we 
select the Committees’ official meetings that treat Draft budget 2012-13, 2013-14 and 
2014-15 that took place in 2011, 2012, and 2013, respectively.  
Table 2 presents an analysis of these Committees’ meetings. As we see, during Session 
4, the Committees devoted on average 27.32 % of their official meetings to budget 
issues. However, the differences between the Committees vary. For instance, whereas 
the Justice Committee devoted only 19.57 % of its meetings to budgetary matters, the 
Local Government and Regeneration Committee dedicated 35.06% of its meetings in 
2011 (see the minimum and maximum of the ‘% Budget meetings’ column, 
respectively). The extent to which these meetings were open to the public (any citizen is 
allowed to attend the Committee’s meeting) or in camera (a private discussion  where 
only the Committee members can attend the meeting) also varied considerably. For 
example, the Finance Committee took 61.54 % of their budget matters in public (38.46 
% in camera), while others devoted a much lower percentage (the average is 44.54 %) 
(see ‘% Public (Open) budget business’ column). 
 
(Table 2 here) 
 
As we can see from Table 2, the Scottish Parliament Committees took some budget 
business in open meetings but mostly in private. Significant business is often held in 
private, for example, in selecting their budget adviser, the business committees operate 
in private. Table 3 summarizes what kind of budgetary matters the Committees usually 
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discuss in their meetings, and if they do it in public or private. We find that most budget 
issues are treated in the same way by the different Committees1. 
Only two of the budgetary matters seem to be taken differently by the Committees: the 
budget strategy phase and the Scottish Government's response to the Committee's 
Report. While some Committees deal with the budget strategy phase in public (see e.g., 
Economy, Energy and Tourism Committee), others do it in camera (see e.g., 
Infrastructure and Capital Investment Committee). As for the Scottish Government's 
response to the Committee's Report is the same situation: Finance Committee discusses 
these responses in public, whereas Local Government and Regeneration Committee do 
it in camera.  Regarding the rest of budgetary matters, we find that the most important 
issues related to the budget scrutiny process are also taken in camera (considering a 
briefing from its budget adviser on the Scottish Government's Draft Budget; agreeing 
the approach to the scrutiny of the Scottish Government’s Draft Budget; reviewing the 
evidence heard; considering the draft report on the Scottish Government’s Draft Budget; 
and, agreeing the report on the Scottish Government’s Draft Budget), while open 
meetings are only held to take evidence on the Scottish Government’s Draft Budget. 
 
 (Table 3 here) 
 
Therefore, it seems that the Committees do not scrutinize the Scottish Government’s 
Draft Budget in a very transparent way. They deal with the most important budget 
business in camera, while open meetings are only held to take evidence. 
5.2. Levels of Transparency: An Examination of the BL Model 
In this section, Committee reports are studied to assess evidence of the levels of 
transparency identified in the BL model (Biondi and Lapsley, 2014). As part of the 
Scottish Government budgetary cycle, Committees of the Scottish Parliament have an 
opportunity to comment on the budget proposals and to make specific requests for 
additional information.  
In this section, we examine the Committees’ official reports on the Scottish 
Government’s Draft Budget for 2014-15. We have classified the different requests that 
                                                           
1
 We would like to note that some of the budgetary matters are not discussed in some of the Scottish 
Parliament Committees.  
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Committees made in their official report on Scottish Government’s Draft Budget 2014-
15 into three categories: requests for more information; requests for clarification; and a 
wish list of desirable lines of expenditure in the budget, from a Committee perspective. 
These categories are related to the three levels of budget transparency as referred to in 
the BL model: access to information, understanding of the phenomenon disclosed and 
shared meanings, respectively. The third example of transparency over ‘shared 
meanings’ uses expressions of proposed new expenditure (or `wish lists`) by 
Committees as indicative of shared meanings over what is desirable within the sphere of 
interest of particular Committees. Table 4 presents an analysis of the Committees’ 
requests.  
 
(Table 4 here) 
 
As can be seen from Table 4, during the discussion of the Scottish Government’s Draft 
Budget 2014-15 in the different Committees, on average, 43.18% of the Committees’ 
requests were related to requests for more information, with 25.31% for clarification and 
the remaining 31.51% for wish list items. However, the differences between the 
Committees vary widely. For example, 69.64 % of the Economy, Energy and Tourism 
Committee’s requests related to more information, while others devoted a much lower 
percentage to this issue (the average was 43.18 %). Moreover, whereas the Infrastructure 
and Capital Investment Committee devoted only 10.71% of their requests on Scottish 
Government’s Draft Budget 2014-15 to ask for clarification, the Education and Culture 
Committee dedicated 41.67% (see the minimum and maximum of the ‘% Requests for 
clarification’ column, respectively). Finally, the differences regarding the wish list are 
also significant (see the minimum (15.38%) and maximum (46.43%) of the ‘%Wish list’ 
column).  
Therefore, the Committees official reports on Government’s Draft Budget 2014-15 
indicate that the Scottish Government is not so transparent, since the Committees have 
to ask the Scottish Government for more information, for clarification or to express 
wishes about Government’s Draft Budget (233 requests in total). Indeed, certain of these 
results are prima facie evidence of a failure by the Scottish Government to reach the first 
level of budget transparency, since the 43.18% of the requests are related to asking for 
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more information from the Scottish Government, so it would appear that more access to 
budget information is required. Similarly, the levels of questions seeking clarifications 
raise issues about levels of understanding within budget discussions (i.e. BLs level 2 
transparency). However, the range of requests for additional funds shows that there may 
be shared meanings within certain of these Committees, thereby indicating possible 
level 3 transparency as defined by BL. 
5.3. Levels of Transparency: The BL Model revisited. 
In our interviews with the MSPs on transparency in the Scottish budgetary system, there 
was a distinct convergence of views which supported but also extended the preliminary 
analysis above. In the discussion of Level 1 transparency there was a consistent message 
that “we pretty much get what we want” (MSP3). One MSP (MSP2) clarified the 
manner and nature of requests by Committees for more information from the 
Government, which they saw as exercising their right to information. One interviewee 
(MSP5) observed that the Cabinet Secretary in their area gave evidence and if he could 
not answer questions directly on the day, he would provide a written answer which this 
Committee felt was completely transparent. However, there were suggestions that not all 
questions were fully answered. This includes a query which MSP1 had on business rates 
which was never fully answered to his satisfaction. Also, MSP4 encountered evasive, 
opaque evidence from a government agency while taking evidence on the budget. This 
was ultimately resolved, but can be seen as indicative that total transparency at level 1 is 
not achieved. An interesting angle on this was presented by MSP6, who observed that in 
the main the Committees were heavily dependent on their budget advisors (external 
experts appointed by each Committee). This MSP also observed that, despite apparent 
transparency, the Committees had never achieved any significant budget change. This 
issue is taken up further below. 
Regarding BL level 2 transparency, there is unanimity within our MSP interviewees. 
MSP5 simply said “No” to the query over whether Committee members understood 
budget documents. MSP6 elaborated upon this: 
 “Definitely not. We are offered no training. I dealt with budgets in my previous 
job. I took further training, read books and consulted with an expert in the field, 
but this is not typical”. 
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This latter statement indicates unevenness in levels of understanding. MSP1 observed 
that there is variation, because some Committee members are skilled in financial 
matters, but others are not. So MSP1 supports the idea of variations in the level of 
understanding amongst Committee members. MSP3 expanded on this by reinforcing the 
observation that most Committee members have a different skill set and are not finance 
experts. This was reiterated by MSP4 who made the comment that not all members of 
her Committee understood the budget documents. MSP2 said Committee members get 
better at understanding and interrogating budget documents with time but conceded that 
for most Committee members their level of understanding of the budget was narrow and 
constrained to the specific Committee of which they were a member. These findings 
suggest that BL level 2 transparency is not being attained in this study setting. 
The findings on level 3 transparency, the existence of shared meanings on the budget 
were surprising. The analysis of documentary evidence suggests Committee members 
coming together for wish lists of desirable expenditure which is indicative of a level of 
shared understanding over the nature of the budget. However, the views of the 
interviewees undermine this view. As MSP2 expressed it: 
“In practice the Committee comprises individuals who have different levels of 
understanding of budgetary processes, so a shared understanding is not readily 
achievable”. 
This perspective is reflected in the comments of MSP3 and MSP4. As MSP3 
commented: 
“We are a mixed ability group on the budget. Some have a background in finance, 
some do not. So the idea of a ‘shared understanding’ is too much to expect”.  
A refinement of this perspective was expressed by MSP4 who talked about the desire to 
finalise Committee reports with a shared understanding to which all the Committee can 
sign up. But this MSP said this was an aim to get everyone on the same wavelength, 
which was not actually achieved in practice. 
A sharper critique was offered by MSP6, who observed that there are no shared 
understandings on Committees. In his view the Committee structure at the Scottish 
Parliament is dominated by a majority of the ruling administration. This meant 
Committee reports were not a case of a coming together of the thinking of Committee 
members. In his view these reports on the budget were an imposition of the ruling 
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political party views. The overhang of politics – political action and political thinking – 
on the budget process were elaborated upon further by MSP1. This MSP made the 
following observation: 
“In the Committee discussions, the party element comes in. It encourages 
differences. Then you consider the limited skill sets of members. There is an urge 
to look differently at things. We do have the budget documents. We look at them, 
regularly. But all of us are politicians. Once you are within the political party 
mindset, you are working to a different angle than the idea of a shared 
understanding. It depends on politics and following the party line”. 
These comments from our elite interviewees offer a deep insight into the budgetary 
processes within this parliament. The elusive attainability of level 2 transparency is 
because of the limited expertise of politicians. However, this evidence suggests that the 
shared understandings of level 3 transparency are unachievable because of political 
action and will, as the majority expressed by political arithmetic is used to express the 
Committee view. In sum, the evidence of these high level politicians is that the best that 
can be hoped for in terms of internal transparency is the level 1 of accessibility and even 
here there may be occasional flaws. Most importantly, the actions of elected 
representatives can undermine the stated aim of this Parliament of providing 
transparency and raise questions over whether the electorate can trust politicians. 
6. Conclusion 
The issue of transparency in government budgeting is extremely topical. Prominent 
bodies such as the IMF (IMF, 2014) and the OECD (OECD, 2014) have declared the 
importance of transparency in public finances. Academic commentators have observed 
the significance of transparency in contemporary debates on government, suggesting 
that it has become so accepted that it is beyond challenge, almost a new religion (Shah 
et al., 2003; Hood, 2006). There is now a significant literature on the topic of 
transparency in government, particularly public finances. However, most of this 
literature is directed at discussion of transparency as an external, outward-facing 
phenomenon by which state bodies are, or should be, held publicly accountable for their 
activities. A new development in the transparency literature is the need to address 
internal transparency in public services organisations as an important element of the 
transparency debate (Heald, 2012; 2013; Robbins and Lapsley, 2015). This paper 
contributes to this debate on future directions of transparency policy and practice by 
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offering fresh evidence on government budgeting using a novel lens, the BL model 
(Biondi and Lapsley, 2014), to study internal transparency in practice. The BL model 
offers a more nuanced interpretation of what transparency means in practice. In 
particular, it does this by focussing on different levels of transparency, rather than 
adopting implicit assumptions over disclosure equating to transparency. Similarly, this 
model extends beyond the idea that transparency can be achieved by key actors 
understanding the nature of disclosed information. In particular, the BL model identifies 
the highest level of transparency as being achieved when information is not only made 
available (Level 1) or understood (Level 2), but when this information is acted upon in a 
meaningful way (Level 3).  Specifically, we seek to analysis if these three levels of 
budget transparency articulated in the BL model are being achieved by the main actors 
involved in the Scottish budget process. We used the business Committees of the 
Scottish Parliament as a focus for this study using a combined methods approach with 
documentary analysis, some observation and elite interviews with experienced 
parliamentarians. 
As stated above, this study is based on the experiences of the Scottish Parliament. This 
is a new Parliament which was formed in 1999. It was established in part to address a 
lack of transparency in parliamentary business at Westminster, from a Scottish 
perspective (Bogdanor, 2001). By way of response, the new Scottish Parliament was to 
have openness with the electorate and the public as a major consideration (Mitchell, 
2006). Indeed, the Scottish Parliament was established with a specific aim of 
transparency in public finances and was designed to ensure the business Committees of 
the parliament had a significant oversight responsibility for the budgetary process 
Scottish Office (1998). All of this makes this study setting particularly appropriate for a 
study of internal transparency.  
In the transparency literature, there is a presumption that transparency and openness are 
valued and welcomed. But this study offers evidence that this presumption is fallacious. 
Indeed, evidence is offered that politicians do not want transparency. There is evidence 
of level 1 transparency (access in the BL model’s terms (Biondi and Lapsley, 
2014)).However, certain of the elected representatives asserted that they had full access 
to information. These  politicians said they could always pretty much get what they 
want. Nevertheless there were examples of significant issues which were raised by 
members of the parliament but which were not  fully addressed by the Government.  
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More importantly, when politicians had the discretion to select open business or in 
camera, there was a consistent pattern of reserving important elements of the budgetary 
debate for private discussion. This revealed preference for a lack of transparency can be 
seen from the actions of the business Committees on how they deal with budgetary 
discussions. While budget sessions where the Committee is taking evidence are held in 
public, the substantive issues are in camera.  
Regarding level 2 transparency as understanding (Biondi and Lapsley, 2014), there was 
evidence within Committee reports of significant levels of requests for clarifications 
where Committees could not understand budgetary documents or the members felt they 
were opaque. It was also a consensus view from our elite interviews that many 
Committee members had limited expertise in budgetary matters and did not have a good 
understanding of the budgetary documents. This particular finding has a direct impact 
on the BL model’s level 3 transparency (shared meanings or understandings) (Biondi 
and Lapsley, 2014). Given the variability in understanding, the elite interviewees 
reported that there was little or no prospect of level 3 transparency being reached. 
Interestingly, two MSPs, one from the ruling party and one from the main opposition 
party stated that ultimately the decisions of the Committees were based on political 
arithmetic, accepting the party line and enforcing an apparent consensus by majority. 
These findings reaffirm the idea that politicians are not interested in transparency, 
although they may make public utterances in favour of it. This underlines the trust 
dimension in transparency. If politicians pay lip service to fundamental tenets of 
contemporary public finance such as transparency, this raises major issues over the 
extent to which electorates can trust politicians. 
The topic of internal transparency is novel. There is a need for further research in this 
area to determine if political will and actions inhibits constrains and limits transparency 
in government budgeting in other contexts. This was case study research in a setting 
which was designed to be transparent. There is a need for further research in a variety of 
contexts to determine of internal transparency in governments will forever be elusive 
where politicians hold sway. One distinct dimension of the activities of governments 
and politicians is that of trust: the manner in which citizens place trust in their elected 
representatives and the governments which are charged with the responsibility of acting 
on behalf of electorates. This study has uncovered issues of trust in politicians, but has 
not specifically focussed on this dimension of transparency.. It is evident from this study 
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that the concept of trust is implicit in the debate on transparency. We recommend further 
research which examines both transparency and trust in government budgeting, 
particularly from the perspective of political action and political discretion.. 
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Table1. Scottish Parliament’s Committees selected 
Finance Committee 
Economy, Energy and Tourism Committee  
Infrastructure and Capital Investment Committee 
Health and Sport Committee 
Local Government and Regeneration Committee 
Education and Culture Committee 
Justice Committee 
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Table 2. Analysis of the Scottish Parliament’s Committees meetings that deal with budget issues during Session 4 
Committee Budget 
meetings 
Total 
meetings 
% Budget 
meetings 
Public 
(Open) 
budget 
business 
Private (in 
camera) 
budget 
business 
Total 
Budget 
business* 
% Public 
(Open) 
budget 
business 
% Private 
(in 
camera) 
budget 
business 
Finance 24 79 30.38 16 10 26 61.54 38.46 
Economy, Energy and Tourism  23 86 26.74 14 15 29 48.28 51.72 
Infrastructure and Capital Investment  21 62 33.87 11 13 24 45.83 54.17 
Health and Sport  20 89 22.47 8 13 21 38.10 61.90 
Local Government and Regeneration  27 77 35.06 10 26 36 27.78 72.22 
Education and Culture 19 82 23.17 9 12 21 42.86 57.14 
Justice  18 92 19.57 9 10 19 47.37 52.63 
Mean 21.71 81.00 27.32 11.00 14.14 25.14 44.54 55.46 
Minimum 18 62 19.57 8 10 19 27.78 38.46 
Maximum 27 92 35.06 16 26 36 61.54 72.22 
Own elaboration from the Scottish Parliament website 
Notes: *It is the sum of ‘Public (Open) budget business’ and ‘Private (in camera) budget business’ columns. This is because those budget meetings in which the Committee agreed 
to take some budget issues (business) in public (open) and other in private (in camera) appear represented twice (in ‘Public (Open) budget business’ and ‘Private (in camera) budget 
business’ columns, respectively).  
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Table 3. Budget business discussed by the Scottish Parliament’s Committees during Session 4 
The Committee 
agrees its 
response to the 
Finance 
Committee on 
the Budget 
Strategy Phase 
The 
Committee 
considers a 
briefing from 
its budget 
adviser on 
the Scottish 
Government's 
Draft Budget 
The 
Committee 
agrees its 
approach to 
the scrutiny 
of the 
Scottish 
Governmen
t's Draft 
Budget 
The 
Committee 
takes 
evidence on 
the Scottish 
Governmen
t's Draft 
Budget 
The Committee 
reviews the 
evidence heard 
earlier 
The Committee 
considers a 
(revised) draft 
report (to the 
Finance 
Committee) on 
the Scottish 
Government's 
Draft Budget 
The 
Committee 
agrees its 
report on the 
Scottish 
Government's 
Draft Budget 
             
      BUDGET BUSINESS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COMMITTEES 
Public Private Private Private Public Public Private Private Private 
Finance  
         
Economy, Energy and Tourism          
Infrastructure and Capital 
Investment           
Health and Sport 
 
 
       
Local Government and 
Regeneration          
Education and Culture 
     *    
Justice          
Own elaboration from the Scottish Parliament website 
Notes: *The Committee reviewed the evidence heard in only one of its meetings (26th Meeting, 23 October 2012) in public, although this is not common even in the 
Committee itself.  
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Table 4. Analysis of Committees’ requests on Scottish Government’s Draft Budget 2014-15 
Committee Requests 
for more 
information 
Requests 
for 
clarification 
Wish list Total 
requests 
% Requests 
for more 
information 
% Requests 
for 
clarification 
% Wish list 
Finance 36 19 10 65 55.38 29.23 15.38 
Economy, Energy and Tourism  39 8 9 56 69.64 14.29 16.07 
Infrastructure and Capital Investment 12 3 13 28 42.86 10.71 46.43 
Health and Sport 14 13 14 41 34.15 31.71 34.15 
Local Government and Regeneration 4 5 4 13 30.77 38.46 30.77 
Education and Culture 3 5 4 12 25.00 41.67 33.33 
Justice 8 2 8 18 44.44 11.11 44.44 
Mean 16.57 7.86 8.86 33.29 43.18 25.31 31.51 
Minimum 3 2 4 12 25.00 10.71 15.38 
Maximum 39 19 14 65 69.64 41.67 46.43 
Own elaboration from the Scottish Parliament website 
